Perhaps it is possible to overcome the essential-awareness
up to the return into a beingness with knowledge, permitting a
new type of human action over a new type of material existence.
It might be possible for the essential-beingness not to remain
only meditative (although it could also remain as such), but the
individualized and socialized self-consciousnesses to trigger
a will and a purpose of reason, as resulting from
the complete extension of beingness-individual-socialness into
the world.
If rationality is essential for science (as
the whole history of science has proved) than the philosophical
experiment, going up to the limits of to-day's rational thinking
still remains anchored in a rationality that it tries to push
as far as possible. (Nevertheless, it is trying continuously to
penetrate beyond these limits, either for contacting the beingness
phenomena, or for interpreting, on a rational scale, certain conditions
of the nervous system via new elements and ideas, or for imagining
things.) The philosophical experiment is placed at a limit that
records a historic displacement, in connection with the progress
of scientific knowledge as applied to human society.
Science is not a mere reflection of the material
world, it is construction corresponding to the possibilities
of our central nervous system, an active construction based
on the principle of compatibility or identity between the nervous
system and the rest of the world. The brain, our central nervous
system, is in the last instance a material device surrounded by
the rest of the matter. A rather surprising fact is that the brain
can perform experiments not only on what it is outside it, but
also on itself.
The beingness experiment appeared to us rather
like a physical phenomenon once we managed to detach it
from any consciousness fact and from a certain afective state,
i.e. from any of the usual psychic processes. Hence, if anything
exists "beyond" our central nervous system, and coupled
with it, then that is a physical entity, possibly an information
carrier, but not a conscious one. Consciousness supposes a specific
material organization; we find consciousness here, in our existence,
but this does not exclude the possibility of it radiating "somewhere"
through beingness. We have seen that to the beingness experiment
one can associate immediately a psychic state, a state-symbol,
that can be memorized, can be recalled to the mind without actually
living the beingness. Experimenting beingness simultaneously with
the consciousness of its symbol (with a new state resulting from
the confrontation of the first two, a state by which we realize
what is taking place) we sense the difference between the phenomenon
and its psychic symbol i.e. knowing, realizing in a natural,
instinctive way a mental, rational construction. It records
the objective, direct, intimate relationship between the physical
reality and the modus operandi of our nervous system. Maybe
the psychic symbol of beingness is after all a reflection, but
its confrontation with reality leading to the state "to know"
is no longer a reflection, but an active construction of our mind.
The constructive character of o knowledge
in relation with the external human world is now recognized as
such in psychology up to the study of perception
phenomena8.
Very interesting experiments regarding the visual perception have
shown that perception, for example of a group of figures, does
not represent in a sure way the reality around us, but according
to W. H. Itelson and F. P. Kilpatrik, perception is our personal
construction meant to obtain the best possible interpretation
to lead our action9.
Such a statement is based on past experience
since the subject seems to connect to the configuration that stimulates
it, a complex that integrates probabilistically various previous
experiences having similar
configurations10.
For this reason, if an external view creates
on the retina a configuration identical with a known image then
it will be interpreted as the known one; only after a more detailed
analysis the perception will change, even if the image on the
retina remains the same. Thus perception appears as a function
of action, experience and probability. For the two authors, as
mentioned before, the perceived thing forms an inseparable part
of the perception function, i.e. the perceived thing is not a
subjective creation of the mind, nor a revelation of some reality
postulated to exist apart from the perceiving organism. The object
and the perception are parts and fragments of the same
thing11.
The philosophical importance of this point
of view, experimentally sustained, comes from the conclusion that
an objective compatibility correspondence exists between what
it is "outside" and what it is "in the mind".
Hence the objective character of human knowledge. Although direct
perception is never sure, nevertheless we construct models to
interpret the world as correct as possible; this is our way of
interacting with the surroundings.
Certain general models are known for the decision
taking activity of the human machine (the central nervous
system)12.
Sometimes this decision taking process is considered a result
of man's will. But it seems that the decision of an action, a
movement, a behavior, is taken in the reticular formation of the
spine (see the cybernetic model of W. L. Kilmer and W. S.
McCullogh13).
This model has at least the merit of ordering a series of concepts
regarding the decisions taken by the nervous system. According
to this model, the reticular formation is treated as being a series
of modules (Fig.1) that receive sensorial stimuli (usually different,
but partly common) from various modules. The response (decision)
can undergo a certain number of ways of action. If over half of
the modules attach over 50% to a certain mode of response, than
the decision is take in favour of this mode. The sensorial excitation
is different for each module, while the reticular formation works
in close correlation with the brain. The brain probably offers
multiple ways of solution, while the reticular formation is to
make the choice. The brain also offers the motivational and affective
elements that play an important role in decision taking. C. Balaceanu
and E. Nicolau distinguish a biological motivation and ahigher
psychological
motivation14.
The decision process taking place in the reticular formation has
a biological character, i.e. non-psychological, and could also
be taken automatically. The decision can not be connected with
a will only, as also observed in psychology. "Indeed, since
the behavior must be permanently dynamical, the principal factor
conditioning its development and its efficiency is the decision.
But this does not depend only on the state of the cognitive (and
volitional) components of the system, but also on the general
traits of the personality, on its orientation, on the assembled
attitudes and significances with which the subject
meets the world. Hence, when one analyzes and explains the dynamics
of behavior, one should also take into consideration the affective
and emotional
factors"15.
The Awareness Experiment
55