3. If the material world is relatively simple in profundities, yet subtle if referred to our present way of thinking, why should we try to grasp it with the sole means of mathematical abstractions ? Why couldn't we also describe it to a certain extent using ordinary language ? Heisenberg himself raises this question: "We do not know how far the mathematical language can be applied to phenomena. Finally, science will likewise have to rely on ordinary language ... " (p. 244). He considers it necessary "to mediate between the two languages incessantly" (p. 245), because the natural language might allow us to describe also those intimate structures of the world that could not be approached by rational means (p. 244-245). "I cannot discuss here what this way of understanding really means" (p. 245), Heisenberg says. At this point Heisenberg obviously comes to a deadlock. He cannot yet formulate an articulate view on the world. For him, abstractions arise "from the continuity of questions, from the tendency towards unity" (p. 207), and this procedure is identified with mathematics. However, just as he is about to grasp this unity, confident as he is that his presupposition on a unified theory of elementary particles can be validated, this unity disrupts, and he is forced to forebear this aim so as to approach other aspects of reality too. Before grasping the supposed unity of the material world, everything is very clear to us: "If one interprets Aristotle's reflection on the Pythagorean thought in a modern fashion, one can see that things, i.e. phenomena, may be ordered, and inasmuch as they are ordered, understood by their correlation with mathematical forms. However, this correlation should not be considered as an arbitrary act of our capacity to think, but as something objective" (p. 199).

In his search for unity, Heisenberg is afraid lest physics and the world itself should come to an end. Although he declared himself to be a staunch supporter of mathematical abstractions, he considers this line of thought to be limited recalling Plato's dissatisfaction in this respect: " Plato himself was not content with this limitation" (p. 245).
Can we be certain that what we are striving to find is a strictly uniform unity, with no contradictory or contradiction-generating structure, as a fundamental of the material world ? What could then be the validity of dialectics if it were invalidated in the profundities of the material world and would only be at play at other levels of existence ?
The infinite is not possible in a physical-experimental interpretation, and yet this concept is fairly intelligible in terms of mathematics. If the mathematical abstraction called infinite is applied to the real world, or to our universe, considering it to be an objective reflection of a reality, then we shall say that the universe is infinite. This is however unacceptable in experimental or phenomenal terms. Of course, we should not dispense with the mathematical abstraction of infinite because of the above argument. Much to the contrary, the possibility of the concept of infinite must hide, in consideration of the finitude of the universe, a more profound truth which we have to find.
The finite-infinite contradiction in understanding the universe is not a mere antinomy, as Kant would say. It is a dialectical reality mirroring a deeper reality. It forces us to go beyond the space-time realm in the universe, to orthoexistence, itself a part of the over-all existence, where we can see the simple principles and the unity of the world. However, here we have to presume the existence of two principles, for the unity of the world itself may be essentially dialectical. The sources of the universe lie in orthoexistence, the space-time universe originates thereof, and so do the elementary particles and the quantum world. The world is generated according to its own logical scheme which we can and must comprehend. Let us now see how abstract this law is. Is it sufficient to regard this quantum-generating world through the meshes of the quantum world and so depart from beings and even from our investigation tools, or could we approach it straightforwardly, from within ? We could no doubt advance employing other physical and mathematical abstractions to explain the quantum world, but this abstract drive towards profundities will raise the topical question on the possibility of immediate approach or experimental work as correlatives. As concerns the experiment beneath the quantum world, by elementary particle collisions, nothing new seems to be expected. We cannot break an elementary particle, because, as Heisenberg says, along this line, elementary particle collisions derive always into elementary particles. Otherwise stated, mechanical processes preclude insight into the profound world. The immediate question is now whether like physical processes can experimentally justify the necessity to work out quantum-informational theories. And then whether such theories could lead to new experimental procedures which should be based on information. Of course, the idea of a quantum-informational theory is not out of the question, but the experiment for validating such theories requires entirely new scientific instruments which should rely on biological phenomena, or material devices incorporating ingredients pertinent to the living realm.

4. The object - subject relation was a major scientific interest with Heisenberg, who placed it under the uncertainty principle. Heisenberg holds that matter, space and time are not "that sound, man-independent realities as was contended in the 19th century". For Heisenberg, this idea derives from quantum mechanics because "the laws of nature which we formulate mathematically in the quantum theory no longer refer to elementary particles in se, but to our knowledge on these elementary particles" (p. 112-113). Quantum mathematics "represent no longer the behavior of elementary particles, but the knowledge we have about this behavior" (p. 113). This question is philosophically difficult, yet it can be explained in terms of the integrating concept of the ring of the existence. Heisenberg is never concerned to examine the subject, because he considers the machine of the subject qua given, as a cognitive instrument. The trajectory, position and speed are the images formed in the subject with respect to the immediate reality. However, as the subject sounds ever deeper aspects of the underlying reality, these images become increasingly uncertain. Under Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, the electron should be sometimes viewed as spatially flat because of the impossibility to specify or determine its actual position, which can only be predicted on the basis of probability data. If we venture to penetrate deeper, then the concept of continuous space itself becomes questionable. We may righteously ask whether the space is not itself quantum, and, sounding even deeper, we may ask whether space is any longer at play, or, otherwise stated, whether it is any more. The continuous space appears to be related to the subject, and may be regarded as subjective unless we seek the objective in the subject, i.e. the physical and psychological structure of the subject. In defect of such a study, knowledge can only be incomplete. That is why the author has undertaken this tentative examination. He regards space as an objective existence, and because of some objective properties of the subject device (or machine), the direct intuitive image is that of a continuous space which has an objective content by the subject. However, the space is essentially quantum, and is generated from orthoexistence or from a spaceless realm, like all elementary particles. This allows us to connect the subject (its objective content) with the object via the macroscopic-microscopic relation which we observe, and to have a phenomenological understanding of orthoexistence. This view is partly akin to Heisenberg's but it springs from the different standpoint given by the concept of the ring of the existence.


What Physics, Informationand the Living have in Common 26