3. If the material world is relatively
simple in profundities, yet subtle if referred to our present
way of thinking, why should we try to grasp it with the sole means
of mathematical abstractions ? Why couldn't we also describe it
to a certain extent using ordinary language ? Heisenberg himself
raises this question: "We do not know how far the mathematical
language can be applied to phenomena. Finally, science will likewise
have to rely on ordinary language ... " (p. 244). He
considers it necessary "to mediate between the two languages
incessantly" (p. 245), because the natural language might
allow us to describe also those intimate structures of the world
that could not be approached by rational means (p. 244-245).
"I cannot discuss here what this way of understanding really
means" (p. 245), Heisenberg says. At this point Heisenberg
obviously comes to a deadlock. He cannot yet formulate an articulate
view on the world. For him, abstractions arise "from the
continuity of questions, from the tendency towards unity"
(p. 207), and this procedure is identified with mathematics. However,
just as he is about to grasp this unity, confident as he is that
his presupposition on a unified theory of elementary particles
can be validated, this unity disrupts, and he is forced to forebear
this aim so as to approach other aspects of reality too. Before
grasping the supposed unity of the material world, everything
is very clear to us: "If one interprets Aristotle's reflection
on the Pythagorean thought in a modern fashion, one can see that
things, i.e. phenomena, may be ordered, and inasmuch as they are
ordered, understood by their correlation with mathematical forms.
However, this correlation should not be considered as an arbitrary
act of our capacity to think, but as something objective"
(p. 199).
In his search for unity, Heisenberg is afraid
lest physics and the world itself should come to an end. Although
he declared himself to be a staunch supporter of mathematical
abstractions, he considers this line of thought to be limited
recalling Plato's dissatisfaction in this respect: " Plato
himself was not content with this limitation" (p. 245).
Can we be certain that what we are striving
to find is a strictly uniform unity, with no contradictory or
contradiction-generating structure, as a fundamental of the material
world ? What could then be the validity of dialectics if it were
invalidated in the profundities of the material world and would
only be at play at other levels of existence ?
The infinite is not possible in a physical-experimental
interpretation, and yet this concept is fairly intelligible in
terms of mathematics. If the mathematical abstraction called infinite
is applied to the real world, or to our universe, considering
it to be an objective reflection of a reality, then we shall say
that the universe is infinite. This is however unacceptable in
experimental or phenomenal terms. Of course, we should not dispense
with the mathematical abstraction of infinite because of the above
argument. Much to the contrary, the possibility of the concept
of infinite must hide, in consideration of the finitude of the
universe, a more profound truth which we have to find.
The finite-infinite contradiction in understanding
the universe is not a mere antinomy, as Kant would say. It is
a dialectical reality mirroring a deeper reality. It forces us
to go beyond the space-time realm in the universe, to orthoexistence,
itself a part of the over-all existence, where we can see the
simple principles and the unity of the world. However, here we
have to presume the existence of two principles, for the unity
of the world itself may be essentially dialectical. The sources
of the universe lie in orthoexistence, the space-time universe
originates thereof, and so do the elementary particles and the
quantum world. The world is generated according to its own logical
scheme which we can and must comprehend. Let us now see how abstract
this law is. Is it sufficient to regard this quantum-generating
world through the meshes of the quantum world and so depart from
beings and even from our investigation tools, or could we approach
it straightforwardly, from within ? We could no doubt advance
employing other physical and mathematical abstractions to explain
the quantum world, but this abstract drive towards profundities
will raise the topical question on the possibility of immediate
approach or experimental work as correlatives. As concerns the
experiment beneath the quantum world, by elementary particle
collisions, nothing new seems to be expected. We cannot break
an elementary particle, because, as Heisenberg says, along this
line, elementary particle collisions derive always into elementary
particles. Otherwise stated, mechanical processes preclude insight
into the profound world. The immediate question is now whether
like physical processes can experimentally justify the necessity
to work out quantum-informational theories. And then whether such
theories could lead to new experimental procedures which should
be based on information. Of course, the idea of a quantum-informational
theory is not out of the question, but the experiment for validating
such theories requires entirely new scientific instruments which
should rely on biological phenomena, or material devices incorporating
ingredients pertinent to the living realm.
4. The object - subject relation was
a major scientific interest with Heisenberg, who placed it under
the uncertainty principle. Heisenberg holds that matter, space
and time are not "that sound, man-independent realities as
was contended in the 19th century". For Heisenberg, this
idea derives from quantum mechanics because "the laws of
nature which we formulate mathematically in the quantum theory
no longer refer to elementary particles in se, but to our
knowledge on these elementary particles" (p. 112-113). Quantum
mathematics "represent no longer the behavior of elementary
particles, but the knowledge we have about this behavior"
(p. 113). This question is philosophically difficult, yet it can
be explained in terms of the integrating concept of the ring of
the existence. Heisenberg is never concerned to examine the subject,
because he considers the machine of the subject qua given,
as a cognitive instrument. The trajectory, position and speed
are the images formed in the subject with respect to the immediate
reality. However, as the subject sounds ever deeper aspects of
the underlying reality, these images become increasingly uncertain.
Under Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, the electron should
be sometimes viewed as spatially flat because of the impossibility
to specify or determine its actual position, which can only be
predicted on the basis of probability data. If we venture to penetrate
deeper, then the concept of continuous space itself becomes questionable.
We may righteously ask whether the space is not itself quantum,
and, sounding even deeper, we may ask whether space is any longer
at play, or, otherwise stated, whether it is any more. The continuous
space appears to be related to the subject, and may be regarded
as subjective unless we seek the objective in the subject,
i.e. the physical and psychological structure of the subject.
In defect of such a study, knowledge can only be incomplete. That
is why the author has undertaken this tentative examination. He
regards space as an objective existence, and because of some objective
properties of the subject device (or machine), the direct intuitive
image is that of a continuous space which has an objective content
by the subject. However, the space is essentially quantum,
and is generated from orthoexistence or from a spaceless realm,
like all elementary particles. This allows us to connect the subject
(its objective content) with the object via the macroscopic-microscopic
relation which we observe, and to have a phenomenological understanding
of orthoexistence. This view is partly akin to Heisenberg's but
it springs from the different standpoint given by the concept
of the ring of the existence.
What Physics, Informationand the Living have in Common
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