Steven Rose, biology professor at Open University
in England, shows in an interesting survey: "The brain is
biology's greatest challenge. Perhaps in a sense it is the greatest
challenge for science as a whole
..."15.
He takes a materialist point of view, and repels the ideas of
dualism and vitalism. He does not agree with J.
Eccles16
and considers that Eccles introduces a "God of deep spaces".
He observes that "challenge represented by the fact that
the interpretation of brain mechanisms represents one of the last
remaining biological mysteries, the last refuge of shadowy mysticism
and dubious religious philosophy
..."17.
Steven Rose observes that there are more levels at which the activity
of the human brain can be evaluated, and hence criticizes the
reductionist point of view (that explains brain functioning
in term of molecules) but also the
machinist18
point of view since "Thinking of brains as computers - and
persuading other people to think of their own brains as computers
- is a powerful way of controlling and manipulating society for
specified purposes ... It is a parallel trap to the ethological
one, which considers humans as genetically programed
apes"19.
Steven Rose considers that the highest hierarchic level is the
social one, "the interaction of humans, with other
humans"20.
He is for the "whole" interpretation of brain, with
a psychological specification and a social conditioning. Pointing
out both the vitalists and dualists are wholists (integralists),
he repels dualism, vitalism and in general anything that might
be beyond the known scientific elements. For him consciousness
is "an expression of the total of brain activity ...
displayed in thought and
self-awareness"21,
being a function of the number of nervous cells (n)
andof their connectivity (s):
c = f1(n) * f2(s)
Steven Rose does not agree with certain physicists
maintaining that still unknown motion states of matter might exist:
"there are a few distinguished neurobiologists who are still
unashamed dualists. However, more dualists are probably to be
found among the ranks of the philosophers than among the scientists.
Among scientists, most of the concern over the 'abolition' of
mind has come from those who are convinced - often because they
are physicists rather than biologists - that there are still to
be found in biology new laws, forces and properties of matter
which cannot be subsumed under the classical laws of physics and
chemistry"22.
Hence we comment that the scare of dualism should not refrain
us from searching the brain mystery for everything that cannot
be but material, irrespective of being made up from known physical
ingredients or not, or based on new physical principles, yet unknown.
The gate is still open to both possibilities. For Steven Rose
"there are no properties of the brain which cannot be analyzed,
defined, explained and interpreted in terms of the biological
mechanisms which are known to operate in other
systems23.
He says "There are, to put it bluntly, no mysteries
beyond the reach of scientific analysis. There are puzzles and
problems. There will surely be major surprises to
come"24.
However he realizes that something must still be sought. Hence
his stand in the problem of consciousness is that 'mind'
is "the total of brain activity at any given
time"25
and 'consciousness' is "the summation of this total
activity from some point (yet to be established)
..."26.
What kind of departing point thinks Rose that should be searched
for ? And it is not the beingness phenomenon the very departing
point we are looking for ? Indeed, if beingness is taken
as the reference point then both consciousness and awareness can
be explained and hence we can use Rose´s statement that "Consciousness
is seen not as a thing but a process, expressing the relationships
between the mind/brain and its
environment"27.
A review of brain research
achievements28
observes that neurology is now in the stage of development in
which genetics was in 1920´s (when biologists were in a state
of disbelief and frustration). Brain science cannot so far explain
how and where the brain processes of perception, memory, learning,
awareness, consciousness and other take
place29.
F. V. Bassin observed that the concept of "consciousness"
(meaning, awareness) is, as a working notion, foreign to modern
neuro-cybernetics, and hence if previously the unconscious was
trying to gain citizenship into science, now, paradoxical as it
may seem, the consciousness finds itself in the same difficult
position, since questions have appeared regarding its status:
does it reflect a regulatory factor of the nervous activity, or
is it only a sterile functional shade, an epiphenomenon of cerebral
activity that we need not take into account in any serious analysis
of the mechanisms of this
activity30.
A. Kolmogorov31
showed that neuro-cybernetics does not explain consciousness,
at least in its present state, and then considers that in the
developed human consciousness the formal logics mechanism does
not play a decisive role, being but an auxiliary computing device.
Both Bassin and Kolmogorov make no distinction
between consciousness and awareness, but their observations are
meaningful and both give consciousness an important role in neurology.
For them consciousness (and awareness, by implication) is not
an epiphenomenon, but it has an active functional role.
F. V. Bassin considers that it is strange that
consciousness is absent from all the neuro-cybernetic brain descriptions,
since he considers consciousness to be strongly connected with
the activity of the upper levels of human nervous system, that
takes part into this activity assuming a complex and specific
role32.
He takes a critical stand towards psychology disregarding the
"experienced states", considering that this retards
the development of an important chapter of brain
research33.
Starting from the theory of social consciousness, Bassin reveals
the "extremely complex genesis of consciousness, its dependence
on factors that are both psychological and
social34.
The psychological factor cannot be reduced to the physiological
aspect, but nevertheless cannot be separated from it. Bassin examines
various point of views elaborated in the first half of 20th
century35
regarding consciousness (when neuro-cybernetic models of nervous
activity were not known) and concludes that they were a continuation
of machism, by dissolving consciousness in "pure experience".
Weinshen36
and Fessard37
considers that consciousness is a physiological process and admit
that it is located in certain brain structures. According to Fessard
these structures would have an integrating role in the upper nervous
activity. This point of view does no longer consider that consciousness
is an epiphenomenon and hence looks for it as a process of the
human brain with a certain location. Bassin comments that this
leads to a biological conception about consciousness. Following
this line of thought, it was sought to connect consciousness with
the attention (vigilance) levels of the brain, i.e. implicating
the reticular formation however, as Bassin
observed38,
such total association is mechanicistically vulgar.
One should mention that various options as
expressed by various authors are referring either to beingness,
or to consciousness, or to self-consciousness, or to social consciousness,
but always under the same name of consciousness. Further
one should observe that all the points of view mentioned before
are generated by a confused understanding of the processes implicating
consciousness; nevertheless they reflect, in a way or another,
some partial or indirect truth.
The model we propose offers a more detailed
understanding of the consciousness processes. It makes distinction
between various forms of consciousness, between consciousness
and awareness; within awareness it records experimentally, introspectively,
three moments of which only one, the beingness, is still unexplained
by existing sciences. This does not mean that it will not be explained
by science in the future, by some research specific to this concept
of beingness, i.e. in a new stage of scientific development.
Biology and Psychology in Relation with Awareness
60