Steven Rose, biology professor at Open University in England, shows in an interesting survey: "The brain is biology's greatest challenge. Perhaps in a sense it is the greatest challenge for science as a whole ..."15. He takes a materialist point of view, and repels the ideas of dualism and vitalism. He does not agree with J. Eccles16 and considers that Eccles introduces a "God of deep spaces". He observes that "challenge represented by the fact that the interpretation of brain mechanisms represents one of the last remaining biological mysteries, the last refuge of shadowy mysticism and dubious religious philosophy ..."17. Steven Rose observes that there are more levels at which the activity of the human brain can be evaluated, and hence criticizes the reductionist point of view (that explains brain functioning in term of molecules) but also the machinist18 point of view since "Thinking of brains as computers - and persuading other people to think of their own brains as computers - is a powerful way of controlling and manipulating society for specified purposes ... It is a parallel trap to the ethological one, which considers humans as genetically programed apes"19. Steven Rose considers that the highest hierarchic level is the social one, "the interaction of humans, with other humans"20. He is for the "whole" interpretation of brain, with a psychological specification and a social conditioning. Pointing out both the vitalists and dualists are wholists (integralists), he repels dualism, vitalism and in general anything that might be beyond the known scientific elements. For him consciousness is "an expression of the total of brain activity ... displayed in thought and self-awareness"21, being a function of the number of nervous cells (n) andof their connectivity (s):

c = f1(n) * f2(s)

Steven Rose does not agree with certain physicists maintaining that still unknown motion states of matter might exist: "there are a few distinguished neurobiologists who are still unashamed dualists. However, more dualists are probably to be found among the ranks of the philosophers than among the scientists. Among scientists, most of the concern over the 'abolition' of mind has come from those who are convinced - often because they are physicists rather than biologists - that there are still to be found in biology new laws, forces and properties of matter which cannot be subsumed under the classical laws of physics and chemistry"22. Hence we comment that the scare of dualism should not refrain us from searching the brain mystery for everything that cannot be but material, irrespective of being made up from known physical ingredients or not, or based on new physical principles, yet unknown. The gate is still open to both possibilities. For Steven Rose "there are no properties of the brain which cannot be analyzed, defined, explained and interpreted in terms of the biological mechanisms which are known to operate in other systems23. He says "There are, to put it bluntly, no mysteries beyond the reach of scientific analysis. There are puzzles and problems. There will surely be major surprises to come"24. However he realizes that something must still be sought. Hence his stand in the problem of consciousness is that 'mind' is "the total of brain activity at any given time"25 and 'consciousness' is "the summation of this total activity from some point (yet to be established) ..."26. What kind of departing point thinks Rose that should be searched for ? And it is not the beingness phenomenon the very departing point we are looking for ? Indeed, if beingness is taken as the reference point then both consciousness and awareness can be explained and hence we can use Rose´s statement that "Consciousness is seen not as a thing but a process, expressing the relationships between the mind/brain and its environment"27.

A review of brain research achievements28 observes that neurology is now in the stage of development in which genetics was in 1920´s (when biologists were in a state of disbelief and frustration). Brain science cannot so far explain how and where the brain processes of perception, memory, learning, awareness, consciousness and other take place29.
F. V. Bassin observed that the concept of "consciousness" (meaning, awareness) is, as a working notion, foreign to modern neuro-cybernetics, and hence if previously the unconscious was trying to gain citizenship into science, now, paradoxical as it may seem, the consciousness finds itself in the same difficult position, since questions have appeared regarding its status: does it reflect a regulatory factor of the nervous activity, or is it only a sterile functional shade, an epiphenomenon of cerebral activity that we need not take into account in any serious analysis of the mechanisms of this activity30.
A. Kolmogorov31 showed that neuro-cybernetics does not explain consciousness, at least in its present state, and then considers that in the developed human consciousness the formal logics mechanism does not play a decisive role, being but an auxiliary computing device. Both Bassin and Kolmogorov make no distinction between consciousness and awareness, but their observations are meaningful and both give consciousness an important role in neurology. For them consciousness (and awareness, by implication) is not an epiphenomenon, but it has an active functional role.
F. V. Bassin considers that it is strange that consciousness is absent from all the neuro-cybernetic brain descriptions, since he considers consciousness to be strongly connected with the activity of the upper levels of human nervous system, that takes part into this activity assuming a complex and specific role32. He takes a critical stand towards psychology disregarding the "experienced states", considering that this retards the development of an important chapter of brain research33. Starting from the theory of social consciousness, Bassin reveals the "extremely complex genesis of consciousness, its dependence on factors that are both psychological and social34. The psychological factor cannot be reduced to the physiological aspect, but nevertheless cannot be separated from it. Bassin examines various point of views elaborated in the first half of 20th century35 regarding consciousness (when neuro-cybernetic models of nervous activity were not known) and concludes that they were a continuation of machism, by dissolving consciousness in "pure experience".

Weinshen36 and Fessard37 considers that consciousness is a physiological process and admit that it is located in certain brain structures. According to Fessard these structures would have an integrating role in the upper nervous activity. This point of view does no longer consider that consciousness is an epiphenomenon and hence looks for it as a process of the human brain with a certain location. Bassin comments that this leads to a biological conception about consciousness. Following this line of thought, it was sought to connect consciousness with the attention (vigilance) levels of the brain, i.e. implicating the reticular formation however, as Bassin observed38, such total association is mechanicistically vulgar.
One should mention that various options as expressed by various authors are referring either to beingness, or to consciousness, or to self-consciousness, or to social consciousness, but always under the same name of consciousness. Further one should observe that all the points of view mentioned before are generated by a confused understanding of the processes implicating consciousness; nevertheless they reflect, in a way or another, some partial or indirect truth.

The model we propose offers a more detailed understanding of the consciousness processes. It makes distinction between various forms of consciousness, between consciousness and awareness; within awareness it records experimentally, introspectively, three moments of which only one, the beingness, is still unexplained by existing sciences. This does not mean that it will not be explained by science in the future, by some research specific to this concept of beingness, i.e. in a new stage of scientific development.


Biology and Psychology in Relation with Awareness 60