Buddhism is contradictory inasmuch as it states that the world is an illusion, all while considering that "It is indeed fairly difficult to understand the world as it is"¹⁷, and so chooses a mental way ("there is no limit to the mental activities"¹⁸) to penetrate into a deeper realm which is assumed to be a "universal mind" with respect to which no ego-personality actually exists. This breakaway from action and from any scientific view is all the more obvious in the statement that "any meliorating human levels and strivings are in vain"¹⁹, but this is not the entire history of various branches of Buddhist philosophy. The world is empirically found to exist, but it is rationally denied out of an inability to cogitate it in its wholeness. Buddhism tries to go beyond this limit by devising a subjective profundity, which is exerted to the detriment of man's space- and time- related activity. The task of science, which by using the philosophical experiment would not deny some profundity, is to subject like profundities to reason and not to seek reason in itself in this profundity.
Ancient science is science in as much as it introduced the rational in the methods of human thought and in ordering the empirical experience. During the Galileo-Newton stage of science, the rational was only used in the knowledge of laws.

3. The Galileo-Newton science, or the whole block of science recalled at the beginning of this chapter, which we shall call modern science, becomes a science of motion. Lucian Blaga dilated on this aspect of modern science, showing that motion "was first regarded as a fundamental attribute of existence only as late as the 12th century, when the western modernity emerged at so many levels of human activity"²⁰. The differential calculus developed from the need to describe motion in mathematical terms. Motion is at play throughout modern physics (in the universe and in the microcosms). Theory does not feed only on empirical observation, but particularly on experimental observation, which is a conscious, organized, conceptual tool for cognition. According to Blaga, the method of modern science is the joint work of methodological couples, of which the experiment-mathematics couple is the most important. This joint work of methods is referred to by Blaga as "methodological expansion" or supermethod. Experiment and mathematics are viewed as the pillars of modern science, which is aimed to identify the laws of nature. The newness about modern science is that it goes beyond empeiria, or beyond the theory deduced from the immediate experience by a "trans-empirical" theory. Blaga mentions in this respect the principle of inertia - "the keystone of the entire Galilean-Newtonian science", which "is an idea snubbing the whole ordinary empeiria of man"²¹. This idea "exceeds purely experimental observations" as "it has no immediate experimental ground"²²; it springs from the mathematical spirit methodologically coupled with observation. Trans-empirical theorizing had already found a fruitful ground in wave and quantum mechanics. The image-concepts in quantum physics are aimed to furnish "something of the immediate trans-empirical nature of phenomena"²³, but in this case ordinary rationality outrun by a specific intuition relying on a mental-experimental imagination. This is the only way in which science can aim to sound "the secret profundities of existence"²⁴, which means to Blaga an ever deeper thrust into realms where the laws are established for ever deeper layers of matter and knowledge, but not yet into the law-formation zone.

From the mental unrest responsible for the rise of quantum mechanics, let us recall that the logical and mathematical rationality, which was the main contribution of the ancient science, is insufficient for an insight into the material world, though it is essential to science. Logical and mathematical rationality is the honey comb in which science is stocked and by which it develops, even if part of its substance is brought in as raw matter via other mental procedures, via experiments and experience.
The rise of dialectics as a way of thinking expressed the need to go beyond logical and mathematical rationality. Lucian Blaga regarded dialectics as a new rationality which adapts itself to both external and internal empeiria, because our mind finds contradiction to be logically intolerable whileaccepting it psychologically²⁵. Blaga admits that thought is also endowed with a dialectical rationality which he does not regard as a logic, given that logic does not admit contradiction. He likewise observes that dialectical rationality is incompatible with mathematics²⁶ (which is not tantamount to saying that dialectics cannot be applied in mathematics) and recommends a careful examination of this aspect.

Indeed, there is a dialectical contradiction between the corpuscle and wave aspects of the light or the elementary particles. The unity of these contradictory elements is admitted in physics by Bohr's complementarity principle. The electron is actually something more involved than a corpuscle owing to the wave description of its behavior. Its entity is mirrored contradictorily in various experiments, and this casts light on its nature to which we must react by a dialectical rationality of nature. Contradiction shows that (classical, formal or symbolic) logic cannot cover the whole reality. In the corpuscle experiment, the electron description is logical, and so it is in the electron description and we are forced to bring together these fragments of logic into an image that should reflect a more profound reality. Contradiction arises because logic cannot embrace the whole reality, and so we have to resort to another rationality. P. V. Kopnin²⁷ mentions the experience made by N. A. Vasiliev, who attempted to formalize dialectical thought by assuming three types of judgement (in addition to positive or negative judgements, he admits also a judgement of contradiction), but finally he built a formal logic which gives new formulations to the formal logical instrument. Kopnin says that "In materialistic dialectics ... thought is not regarded as an operation activity based on signs and developed according to certain rules (as formal logic is); it is rather a process of concept building ... which is not subject to some sign-to-sign transition rules, but to concept-to-concept transition rules, under no such rigorous rules"²⁸. He contends that the logical-formal instrument does not allow freedom of thought²⁹. However, Kopnin states that dialectical rationality is a dialectical logic distinct from formal logic, and refers to the latter as symbolic logic³⁰. Dialectical logic does not employ calculation, being complementaryto formal, symbolic, mathematical logic. H. Wald likewise refersto a dialectical logic³¹, though he admits that there are Marxian thinkers who do not regard dialectical logic as logic. The mainstay of this statement is that any logical structure of thought is related to speech and writing, that thought cannot exist without speech, which is thesubstance thought is made of³². It is however known that there exist other nonverbal forms of thought³³, and that with respect to action, man has beforehand developed nonverbal modes of modeling and reaction to the surrounding world. Animals work with immediate perception and no verbal speech.

Towards a Science of Law Formation Zone 38