Let us now revert to the question of elementary particles. First, we must accept the existence of a profound matter of which they are built. This matter assumes form but for this it needs information. So, there must exist some profound information determining the state quantities of the elementary particles, and likewise, there must exist some profound information dictating the transformation rules of these, a.s.o. The profound information is statical, yet it is responsible for the dynamics of the processes developing throughout matter. Aristotle must have intuited this fact when he postulated that the Prime mover does not move itself but is responsible for the motion in the universe.
The profound information itself is not unchangeable. It may be changed, it may be self-generated or it may be produced, and a new bulk of statical, profound information may bring about a new universe in its motion.
If referred to the dynamics of the universe, beginning with change of the elementary particles, the profound information determines the state quantities, then the transformation and the behaviour laws are statical.

5. Given that the concept of mattercannot be reduced to Aristotle's concept of matter, i.e. onlyto the "energymatter" in our terminology, for if itwere so reduced, this would mean that other "beings" might exist alongside of matter, the enlarged concept of matter which is associated to the ring of the existence should be clearly explained.
Introducing the concept of profound informational matter presupposes that one accepts the existence of some information which must have a material support in this realm of the world too. We may righteously ask why this informatter should not be entirely veilled by elementary particles, like the energymatter itself. Why should we relate it again to the substance in the universe, of course, under its living form ? These questions will be examined in the following chapters herein.
Let us recall that our approach has not yet leaped into the scientific realm and is still confined to philosophical canons. Although materialistic philosophers have not contested the objective reality of the mental activity, they usually distinguish between the objective reality existing in itself (in the sense of Aristotle) and the objective reality of the mental, brain activity, which exists by otherness (by existence initself).

John C. Eccles and Karl Popper consider three worlds¹⁰:

• a world of objects and physical states, of inorganic and organic substances, of the brain as a physical structure, etc;
• a world of the states of consciousnessqua subjective states, of subjective cognition, ofpsychological phenomena of perception, thought, emotion, memory,creative imagination, etc;
• and a world of objective cognition, of scientific data and laws which do not depend on the individual man, but on the cognition given by culture. This kind of cognition is therefore an outcome of man's social activity. This is a world alien to animals.

While noting the materialistic vein of thisview, let us remark that the second world - of states of consciousness- is regarded as a prime reality because, after Eccles and Popper,our conscious experience is at the basis of knowing the firstworld, which is then a world of secondary reality, a derivativeworld¹¹.
This standpoint is hardly acceptable in materialistic terms. However, if the second and the third worlds are the equivalent of some informational structures, of some programmes, then the model suggested is like a physical substrate/programme (Fig. 3). This model accounts for the objective reality of the mental activity in terms of programme and, ultimately, in terms of information. Consciousness is obviously left outside this model. For this and other reasons, this model is unsatisfactory. That is why we suggest another model (Fig. 4), which supplements the physical substratum of the brain with a new physical ingredient which could account for consciousness and for several other properties of the mental activity.

Matter in Depths20