To define formlessness as a principle is unacceptable,but it is a consequence of the word not-existence. Aristotlewould have initially liked to state only the principles of formand of privation, which as contrary principles could be used tosolve the existence - not-existence issue. However, he could notdispense with the principle of substratum. Formless is actuallya particular case of form, and Aristotle must have been awareof the artificiality in the three-principle edifice as he states:
"That is why one can say that the principles are two, butin a way they are three" (Physics, I, 7, 190 b).
So, two are the fundamental principles withAristotle: matter, which is no doubt understood as an "involvedsubstance", and form.
If we imagine an involved existence, whichhas been herein referred to as orthoexistence, it is expectedto form a prime material substratum which should represent a tendencyto equilibrium. If an absolute state of equilibrium were reached,then this would be equivalent to not-being. Such an involved substance will be herein called energymatter. It might be the sourceof some principles of conservation in physics. The form which is actually applied to energymatter cannot be judgedin defect of matter. Hence, the concept of matter should be morecomprehensive than Aristotle thought. The form is essence with Aristotle:
"theform ... is like order or music or some other thing of those whichare so determined" (Physics, I, 7, 190 b).
The form is therefore most likely responsiblefor the structuring of matter. Then, in compliance with today'sview, form must be information-bearing. However, unlikeAristotle, who thinks that form, qua essence, tendsto an everlasting Prime mover (primum movens) hence to divinity, we think that the form must be carried by a materiatesubstance, which will be called informatter. Hence, twosubstances, the energymatter and the informatter, would be atplay in orthoexistence. The informatter applies to the energymatterto generate motion and universes. However, the informatter containsinformation that is inscribed into a kind of material deviceswhich may be born of the material world itself. Then, an accomplishedring of the existence is formed, which does not imply anythingexterior to it; it is self-consistent. So far, the ring of theexistence seems to place Aristotle's solution on strictly materialisticbasis. Although the concept of the ring of the existence was developedindependently, it furnishes a refined version of Aristotle's concept of matter.

3. We have already mentioned the materialisticgist of Aristotle's doctrine of the prime principles. However,matter is not the sole reality with Aristotle. Things outsidematter can exist as well. The sun and other celestial bodies are without matter in Aristotle's view. And being so, they are eternal(sensibles). Only the things and the substances subject to changehave matter.
The form is so much important with Aristotlethat the substance can be understood only qua form or,otherwise stated, substance is form. The essence of substanceand things is given by form: "By form I mean the essenceof each being ..." (Metaphysics, VII, 7, 1032b). Or "substance is of two kinds: on the one hand, the concretecompound and on the other the formal notion. What I mean is that,in a way, substance is this formal notion. Any substance derivingfrom joining form and matter is ever in the course of being destroyedas it is likewise in the course of being generated. Form is never in the course of being destroyed as it is not in the course ofbecoming either" (Metaphysics, VII, 15, 1039b).
With Aristotle, substances may be also withoutmatter. Thus, the Prime mover, which he cogitates as pure form,nonunited with matter, is substance without matter, has no motionof its own, but sets everything else into motion and so connectseverything else to divinity. In this way, the Prime mover is also the good, and so on.

While noting Aristotle's shuttle work betweenmaterialism and idealism, let us observe that the pure form islikewise cogitated as substance, and he repudiates Plato's conceptionof Ideas as existing in the absence of any substratum. Leaving the suprasensible or God's world aside, matter is a prime principlein the sensible world: "We must now discuss the acknowledgedsubstances, viz those that are sensible, all of which have matter"(Metaphysics , VIII, 1, 1042a).
With Aristotle, the substance is a predicateof matter, the latter being the subject. "By matter I meanthat which in itself is not any particular thing nor is it definedby any of the attributes predicated of being. So that the ultimatesubstratum in itself is not any particular thing, nor of any quantity nor otherwise determined" (Metaphysics VII, 3,1028b). Matter is everlasting in itself: "Next we must observethat neither proximate matter nor proximate form is generated"(Metaphysics, XII, 3, 1069 b).
That the concept of energymatter and Aristotle'sconcept of matter are convergent is obvious. In the ring ofexistence, everything is matter, except the information butnothing can escape matter. In this respect, the conceptof matter in the ring of the existence is far more comprehensive and intricate. But this difference in conception does not obliteratethe compliance of the concept of the ring with Aristotle's view.The concept of energymatter springs as a necessary concept fromthe condition that matter exists in itself and is somewhat derivedfrom the principles of conservation in physics. Aristotle's conceptof matter, or the energymatter in the author's terms, is a continuoussubstance which can be individual in Aristotle's forms: "But substance must be capable of separate existence and be a 'this', so the form, and the compound of form and matter, are more trulysubstance than matter is" (Metaphysics, VIII,3, 1029a).

In the concept of the ring of the existence,the deep matter is subject to two principles - the energymatterand the informatter - which are both matter. The substance, whichis distinct from the profound matter, is likewise matter.

So,this concept of matter is fairly comprehensive and is valid throughoutthe model of the ring of the existence. There exist nothing outside matter or without material support.
In-depth matter cannothowever be reduced to one principle alone. It can only be reducedto two principles, the second being form-giving, just as Aristotle thought. However, what is form-giving is not essence, for theessence is actually produced in the individual and in the socialconsciousness, which can form structures and forms independentlyor using suitable material devices.

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