Given that man is not the most perfect possiblematerial device, though it could
be the most perfect existing,he has limits with respect to the immediate
physical reality andall the more so with respect to what is deeper in the
materialworld. To avoid these limits because of the difficulties encountered
by reason and because of the apparent absurdity they generatewould be a mistake.
To use them as objective facts, delimitingin our reason what is clearly
understood from what is uncertainmeans to recognize these limits as reflecting
deep realities.Notwithstanding the difficulties they raise, these limits do not
make the world uncognizable. Much to the contrary, they possesa certain
transparency we can accede to via the philosophicalexperiment. The
depths of the existence may not be safely modelledwith the aid of the
philosophical experiment from the first instance,but the modeling is perfectible.
The limits of the human beingare objective, but are of such a nature that they
allow cognoscibility.
A more rigorous foundation of the philosophicalexperiment is no doubt necessary,
so as to see what comes offsound and what is speculation. It not impossible to
have finallya "thing-in-itself", or something we can no longer cognize,
but that fairly deep thing-in-itself is not caused by the off-existencespace and
time conceptions, hence, it will not be a Kant-likething-in-itself. Instead, it
will be something about which weknow we have no experimental power to comprehend
but which couldbe made avoidable adopting a new experimental power. Hence, it
will not potentially be a thing-in-itself. The conceptions ofa priori
space and time, Kant argues, are not Ideas, but conceptions of the
understanding in relation with experiment.They are conceptions on man's
cognition process. A new antinomywas actually introduced with the thesis
"space and time pertainto existence as its objective forms, hence as
objective formsof the thing-in-itself" and the antithesis: "space and
time are not objective forms of existence, they are a priori forms of
human cognition". This antinomy is pre-eminentto the antinomy of the
finiteness-infiniteness of space and time.According to Kant, space and time
become thus thing-in-themselves, about which we cannot know anything, but
can only have an Idea of them in the form of an antinomy, to which we
can thereforegive no content. In compliance with Kant's similar arguments,
the existence of space and time and their a priori formare likewise
illusory. To admit a thesis or an antithesis is -Kant argues - a matter of faith
(the same as we can admit theidea of the existence of the Soul, of God a.s.o.)
or an opinionthat, like any idea, may assume a regulative role in the function
of the human reason. A careful examination shows that Kant's systemis subject
to self-destruction. But the surviving ruins sparklewith invaluable diamonds,
for Kant worked with the substance ofcognition to which he, as a scientist,
discovered objective properties.It may be the tragedy and the sublimity of the
human being tofocus the whole rigorous reason in the foundation of ideas. Reason
and understanding are at the service of most diverse ideas, whichare regarded as
regulative ideas. Likewise, science, which isthe basic product of the human
reason and understanding, bearthe stamp of these, and are at the service of a
host of diverseideas. Kant calls our attention also to the regulative ideas of
the human reason, to their essence and foundation, and observesthat a sound,
rigorous reason can only be critical with respectto these ideas. Science must
therefore examine ideas, re-examinethem always and defend the philosophical
projections with itsown data for a well-grounded knowledge.
The Limit of the Thing-in-Itself15
